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AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION:
LAW AND ECONOMICS’ TOPICS OF INVENTION AND
ARRANGEMENT AND TROPES OF STYLE
Michael D. Murray*
Abstract
The Great Recession of 2008 and onward has drawn attention to the
American economic and financial system, and has cast a critical
spotlight on the theories, policies, and assumptions of the modern,
neoclassical school of law and economics—often labeled the "Chicago
School"—because this school of legal economic thought has had great
influence on the American economy and financial system. The Chicago
School's positions on deregulation and the limitation or elimination of
oversight and government restraints on stock markets, derivative
markets, and other financial practices are the result of decades of
neoclassical economic assumptions regarding the efficiency of
unregulated markets, the near-religious-like devotion to a hypersimplified conception of rationality and self-interest with regard to the
persons and institutions participating in the financial system, and a
conception of laws and government policies as incentives and costs in a
manner that excludes the actual conditions and complications of reality.
*
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This Article joins the critical conversation on the Great Recession
and the role of law and economics in this crisis by examining
neoclassical and contemporary law and economics from the perspective
of legal rhetoric. Law and economics has developed into a school of
contemporary legal rhetoric that provides topics of invention and
arrangement and tropes of style to test and improve general legal
discourse in areas beyond the economic analysis of law. The rhetorical
canons of law and economics—mathematical and scientific methods of
analysis and demonstration; the characterization of legal phenomena as
incentives and costs; the rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and
rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral social
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science—make law and economics
a persuasive method of legal analysis and a powerful school of
contemporary legal rhetoric, if used in the right hands.
My Article is the first to examine the prescriptive implications of the
rhetoric of law and economics for general legal discourse as opposed to
examining the benefits and limitations of the economic analysis of law
itself. This Article advances the conversation in two areas: first, as to
the study and understanding of the persuasiveness of law and economics,
particularly because that persuasiveness has played a role in influencing
American economic and financial policy leading up to the Great
Recession; and second, as to the study and understanding of the use of
economic topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in
general legal discourse when evaluated in comparison to the other
schools of classical and contemporary legal rhetoric. I examine each of
the rhetorical canons of law and economics and explain how each can be
used to create meaning, inspire imagination, and improve the
persuasiveness of legal discourse in every area of law. My conclusion is
that the rhetorical canons of law and economics can be used to create
meaning and inspire imagination in legal discourse beyond the economic
analysis of law, but the canons are tools that only are as good as the
user, and can be corrupted in ways that helped to bring about the current
economic crisis.

INTRODUCTION
Law and economics is persuasive. The Great Recession1 is one
by-product of the law and economics movement’s ability to
1

I take the name, “Great Recession,” from none other than Nobel Laureate
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical
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persuade lawyers, legislators, and government officials to
deregulate and remove restraints so as to allow a largely
uninhibited operation of the financial markets and banking
system.2 The discipline of law and economics has its admirers and
economic assumptions when he pointed out that “markets do not work well on
their own” and that in the recent recession, the United States suffered because
the economy lost its “balance between the role of markets and the role of
government.” JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY xii (2010).
2
Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 619 (2001) (“In its
more extreme forms, law and economics solutions to problems of human
behavior were paraded as “science” (not as social science but as “science”), the
findings of which were unassailable. Those who questioned were made to
appear ignorant or foolish.”); Timothy A. Canova, The Failing Bubble
Economy: American Exceptionalism and the Crisis in Legitimacy, 102 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008) (“Lawyers and legal scholars have tended
not to question the economic assumptions of orthodox economic models”);
Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer 2008, at
41; Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the
Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622 (2011); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 171, 173 (2009); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path to
Corporate Responsibility, in Doreen McBarnet, THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY (2007). Even the unofficial dean of the Chicago School,
Judge Richard Posner, has admitted the connection between neoclassical law
and economics and present economic crisis. See RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE
OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION xii, 270
(2009) (“We are learning from [the crisis] that we need a more active and
intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running
off the rails. . . . [T]he market can be blamed for recessions, which without
government intervention would often turn into depressions, as they often did
before the government learned (we thought!) in the after-math of the Great
Depression how to prevent that from happening.”). Alan Greenspan, previously
a staunch advocate of non-regulation of the financial markets, has recently
recanted his faith in the self-correcting power of free markets. Alan Greenspan,
as quoted in EDMUND L. ANDREWS, BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 65 (2009). See also Alan Greenspan, The Crisis,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2010, at 3,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_
bpea_papers/2010a_bpea_greenspan.pdf). Critics have noted that the Chicago
School has worked its effects not only on the United States economy, but
globally. See Paul H. Brietzke, Law and Economics Meets the Great Recession
(2012), copy on file with the author.
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detractors, but modern history confirms that law and economics is
persuasive beyond the confirmed members of the discipline: critics
and supporters alike agreed that at its height law and economics
had established itself as the dominant and most influential
contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.3
My thesis is that if the modes of persuasion of law and economics
are to be used more generally in legal discourse outside the realm
of economic analysis of law, the lessons of the Great Recession
should serve as a caution toward the ethical and responsible use of
these topics and tropes.
My goal here is to critically examine the potential of the law
and economics’ topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of
style as contemporary legal rhetorical devices in areas of law not
currently served by the economic analysis of law. 4 My goal is not

3

Law and economics’ critics and proponents alike agree that at its height the
movement had become the most dominant method of legal analysis among legal
scholars in at least the last fifty years. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142–43 (2003)
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation], which states:
The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the
law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social
sciences. . . . [T]he flourishing of law and economics [is] undeniable,
. . . Economic analysis of law . . . has transformed American legal
thought, . . . [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the legal academy
and in the judiciary . . . [making it] the most important development in
legal scholarship of the twentieth century.
Id. (inner citations omitted). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW xix (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW] ("[Law and economics is] the foremost interdisciplinary field of legal
studies”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 &
n.6 (2005) (law and economics surpasses other movements in legal analysis,
including law and literature).
4
This article continues the conversation I have begun with my work, Law
and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573 (May 3, 2011). I currently plan to release this
work in two parts, the current article here and an article entitled, The Great
Recession and the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics. My project
pursues a new topic in the general conversation begun by other scholars who
have examined the rhetoric of law and economics. E.g., Donald N. McCloskey,
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to critique the neoclassical or contemporary law and economics5
analysis of law nor to examine the benefits or costs of the
application of economic analysis in shaping law and social policy.6
I seek to examine the potential uses and misuses of the rhetorical
devices of law and economics in general legal discourse because
the misuse of these devices played a role in bringing about the
Great Recession.
A central focus of the discipline of law and economics is the
study of human nature and human behavior7 in order to predict
what incentives can be communicated to humans that will motivate
them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common
goal of rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion. The
The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988) [hereinafter
McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics].
5
I use the term “contemporary law and economics” to mean twenty-first
century law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic
approaches to the study and analysis of law. This shall be distinguished from
“new” or “neoclassical” law and economics that developed in the 1960s and
which applied neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the
analysis of law. New or neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as
“traditional” or “conventional” law and economics. See generally POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, at 31; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and
the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088 (1996); Jon Hanson
& David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on
the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77, 83, 138 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The
Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 71, 73; Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism,
and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 470,
470–72 (2007).
6
Not to mention the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency obtained
through contemporary economic analysis of law. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008).
7
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (“law and
economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about
actual human behavior”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science] ("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral
theory, and therein lies its true power.").
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advocates of the economic analysis of law must persuade their own
cohorts of the truth of their discoveries, and use the rhetoric of
their discipline to do so, and also seek to communicate the lessons
of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal community,
and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider
audience.
The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is
persuasive—and not just to legal economists—reveals the
enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal
discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the
discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and
arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the discourse.
The topoi and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive
thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and
the audience. For many members of the legal writing discourse
community—judges, practitioners, government agencies, and
academics—the modes of persuasion of law and economics can
provide a critical perspective to construct meaning and improve the
persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content,
arrangement, and style. As such, law and economics rhetoric can
join the other schools of contemporary rhetoric8—modern
argument theory,9 writing as a process theory,10 and discourse
8

Basic sources on contemporary rhetoric include: PATRICIA BIZZEL & BRUCE
HERZBERG, THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg
eds., 1990); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold,
Rhetoric in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION:
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959); John
B. Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of
Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE (John B.
Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990); James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary
Rhetoric, in THE PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred B. Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990);. See also
sources cited in notes 7–9, infra.
9
See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW,
chs. 2–3, 6–7 (2002); CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE
NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell
Weaver trans., 1969); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO
REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO
REASONING]; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
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community theory11—as a lens through which to examine and
improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse.
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique
combination of modes of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi12
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor,
Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007)
(the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is
the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor
Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169
(2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies);
Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated
Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 139 (2006)
[hereinafter Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An
Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80–81
(2009) [hereinafter Stanchi, Persuasion].
10
See Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing
Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEGAL WRITING 57 (2000) [hereinafter Berger,
Reflective Rhetorical Model]; Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal
Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the
Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993);
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of
Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861 (1995); Carol McCrehan Parker,
Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to
Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal
Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089 (1986); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139.
11
See Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to
In “doctrine” ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary
on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking,
Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002);
Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887 (2002); J. Christopher Rideout &
Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994);
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization
of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998); Joseph M. Williams, On the
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 LEGAL
WRITING 1 (1991).
12
In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus =
“place”) are the “topics” or “subjects” of argument that can be made in various
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and tropes13 to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its
audiences:
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration;
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives
and costs,
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and
o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science.
situations. Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis
[Greek], which may be translated as “invention” or “discovery” of the type of
argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio
[Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the argument, which translates as the “arrangement”
or “organization” or “disposition” of the contents of the argument. See EDWARD
P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN
STUDENT 17, 20, 89–91 (4th ed. 1999); Gabriele Knappe, Classical Rhetoric in
Anglo-Saxon England, 27 ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998).
13
Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio;
Greek lexis), which pertains to the composition and wording of the discourse,
including grammar, word choice, and figures of speech. See generally CORBETT
AND CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra note 10, at 25–26;
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 129, 133–34 & n.2 (collecting sources
on style in classical rhetoric). Figures of speech were divided into tropes
(creative variations on the meanings of words) and schemes (artful deviations
from the ordinary arrangements of words). Linda L. Berger, Studying and
Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3,
51 & n.179 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Law as Rhetoric]. Professors Berger,
Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified tropes as metaphor,
simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word
in two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have
different meanings); periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper
name or of a proper name for a quality associated with the name);
personification; hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement); rhetorical
question; irony; onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox. CORBETT AND
CONNORS, supra, note 10, at 395–409; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra, at 51 &
n.179. See also MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 199–248
(metaphors), 328–40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter SMITH,
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING].
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The rhetorical canons of law and economics have prescriptive
implications for legal discourse as topoi of invention and
arrangement and tropes of style. Many of the topoi and tropes of
law and economics operate on a different level of discourse than
direct communication of economic information to expert members
of the economic discourse community, therefore my discussion
here will examine the concept of rhetorical levels of discourse. I
will then examine each of the canons of law and economics as a
source of rhetorical topoi and tropes for general legal discourse.
I. LEVELS OF DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC
Rhetoric, in the most complete sense, is the study of effective
communication.14 Effectiveness in communication is determined
by the audience and the situation.15 There can be multiple
audiences that receive a communication, some are direct targets
within the conception and understanding of the author in preparing
the discourse, and others are indirect receivers of the discourse.
The level of communication, and thus the level of rhetoric, applied
to the different audiences is not the same—not every audience will
receive, decode, and draw meaning from the communication at the
same level of understanding.
Building on the work of Wayne C. Booth, the late professor
and a leading rhetorician from the University of Chicago (but not
of the “Chicago School” of economics), I will explain the three
levels of rhetorical persuasion:
Level 1 Rhetoric— Understanding of the Members of
Discipline
Level 1 rhetoric (rhetoric-1) is true understanding and
acceptance of the truth of the discourse by members of the
discipline in which the discourse occurs, who are schooled and

14

Gadamer, supra note 13, at 348; Mootz, supra note xx, at 317; White, Law
as Rhetoric, supra note xx, at 695.
15
MAKAY, supra note xx, at 9; ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL
WRITERS, supra note xx, at 9; Wetlaufer, supra note xx, at 1546.
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knowledgeable in the disciple and its theories.
understanding is reserved to experts in the field.16

This level of

Level 2 Rhetoric— Acceptance of the Persuasiveness of the
Discourse by Understanding the Reliability
of the Support
Level 2 rhetoric (rhetoric-2) is not a complete understanding of
the discourse such as the understanding of members of the
discipline of the discourse; the audiences for rhetoric-2 are
receivers or decision-makers who do not completely understand
the doctrine and theories of the discipline of the discourse.
However, level 2 reception of the discourse allows for the audience
to accept the indicia of truth and reliability of the discourse based
on an understanding of the reliability of the sources supporting the
discourse that are used in the discourse17—scientific results,
scholarly sources, accepted forms of evidence, works with known
reputations—or the reliability of sources external to the discourse
that support the discourse—the character and testimony of trusted
recommenders and the observation of peer-acceptance of the work
and the author by members of the same discipline who presumably
have rhetoric-1 understanding of the material in the discourse.18
The acceptance of the reliability of the supporting sources allows

16

See Booth, Idea of University, supra note xx, at 12.
See WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT
xiii, 112 & n.19 (1974). See also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl,
Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of
Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1128 & n.44,
1156 & n.170, 1161–62 (2008) (quoting Eileen A. Scallen & William E.
Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility,
Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1143–
44 (1998) (“[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though not cast in the elegant
form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect. Expert testimony, even that
based on natural or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique
context—the law ....”)).
18
Booth, Idea of University, supra note xx, at 12–13.
17
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for persuasion of the truth and reliability of the discourse even
without fully understanding the discourse.19
Level 3 Rhetoric— Persuasion by the Internal Consistency and
Methodology of the Discourse
The third level of rhetoric (rhetoric-3) again is one in which the
audience of decision-makers does not completely understand the
truth of the discipline and its theories, but the audience observes
the internal consistency and logic and how the discourse tracks
under the evaluation of the design and execution of the
discourse20—an evaluation that asks questions such as: Do the
methods used appear to be sound, does the author appear to be
competent in employing them, and is the end product logical and
internally consistent?21 An example would be the evaluation of a
scholarly journal article to determine if the author appears to be
competent and the writing consistent with the standards for
scholarly inquiry and discourse within the academy or within one
institution, such as a university, as a whole.22 Another rhetorical
way of understanding this level of rhetoric is whether the author
displays the proper ethos of her role in the creation of the
discourse.23
19

Id. Professor Ellen P. Goodman, in Stealth Marketing and Editorial
Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 115 (2006), describes the communication theory
of Jürgen Habermas that depends upon the existence of communicative action in
discourse to “reach understanding” or “communicatively achieved agreement.”
1 Jürgen Habermas, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 42, 286–87, 305
(orig. ed. 1981; Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). Communicative action
persuades by using a set of “validity claims.” Id. at 75, 308. News reporting of
world events may make a “constative” utterance whose claim to validity is truth.
Id. at 309, 323. Storytelling and narrative reasoning may be considered
“expressive” utterances whose claim to validity is rooted in nothing more than
sincerity. Id. at 174, 325–26. “Regulative” utterances have a claim to validity of
“rightness.” Id. Participants to communicative action can either accept these
validity claims or subject them to criticism and demand justification. Id. at 99.
20
Booth, Idea of University, supra note xx, at 13–14.
21
See id.
22
Id.
23
Ethos embodies both moral and intellectual qualities. JAKOB WISSE, ETHOS
AND PATHOS FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 30 (1989). While virtue and high
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In making recommendations for legal discourse based on the
rhetoric of law and economics, I will mention the level of rhetoric
of the device employed. In many instances, it will not be rhetoric1 discourse, that which an economist would aim to achieve when
communicating with other economists, and law and economics
scholars would aim to achieve when communicating with other
law and economics scholars. In most cases, the rhetorical devices
described here will be modes of persuasion at the rhetoric-2 and
moral character obviously are concepts relating to the advocate’s ethics and
morality, the concept of practical wisdom suggests that the audience must
perceive the advocate’s reasoning as sound, not simply from a formal logical
standpoint but in a broader sense of perceiving that the advocate possesses
credibility and common sense. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at
Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a; WISSE, supra, at 30. The concept of good will indicates
that the advocate should evince good will and benevolence toward the audience
as opposed to a spirit of malice revealed through attempted deception,
obfuscation, or self-aggrandizement. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16,
at Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a; CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72–73;
WISSE, supra, at 30–33. Classical rhetoric focused as much on projecting the
right moral character as in possessing it. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10,
at 72; WISSE, supra, at 31; Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99
DICK. L. REV. 85, 100–01 (1994) [hereinafter Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience]. “[A] person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily
persuasive to the hearers.” ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Book
II, ch. 1 at 1378a (emphasis added). Good moral character can be projected
through the discourse itself; it is not necessary that the advocate possess a
widely-known reputation for uprightness and good moral character when
entering into the proceedings or that the advocate self-consciously point out
aspects and examples of his own good character in the discourse (although those
means are recognized as being available to the advocate in proper circumstances
if handled with appropriate delicacy). See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10,
at 72–73; Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra, at 100–101. The
ethical appeal has particular importance in legal discourse because the modes of
persuasion through enthymemes and examples present arguments based on
probability not certainty of proof. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72.
Thus, it matters dearly when the audience weighs the persuasiveness of
arguments and counter-arguments based on probability that the audience
perceive the advocate as credible and believable, “possessing genuine wisdom
and excellence of character.” Id. (quoting 3 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA,
supra note 17, sec. viii at 13). The slightest lapse in good sense, good will, or
moral integrity might turn the audience away from acceptance of the arguments.
Id. at 73.
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rhetoric-3 levels of persuasion: persuasiveness based on the
reliability of the support demonstrated in the rhetoric or
persuasiveness based on the internal logic and methodology—in
short, the ethos—of the discourse.
II. THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics
Contemporary law and economics is a discipline whose
persuasion is built from the application of scientific analyses—
especially mathematics and the quantitative analysis of empirical
data—to social problems.24 Law is a discipline that attempts to
deal with social problems, and legal issues and the social
conditions created or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the
law are problems or conditions that may be subjected to economic
analyses “with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from
the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses.”25
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of
legal rules on behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or
common sense concerning human behavior.26 The theories are
behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will respond to
laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.27 Legal
economists assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on
24

Heilbroner states:
Economics prides itself on its sciencelike character, and economists on
their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values,
preferably in the language of mathematics. . . . [M]ost [economics]
articles are “written” in matrix algebra, complex econometrics, formal
lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics.
They would be
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and
techniques of advanced economics . . . [T]he language of formalism
and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably
“rhetorical.”
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note xx, at 38–39. See also Herbert
M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in
the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42–43, 59 (2009).
25
Posner, Foreword, supra note xx, at 5.
26
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3, 4.
27
See id. at 4.
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the law because it has mathematically precise theories (price
theory and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics
and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules and
sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively
rational) human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for
individuals and for society.28
B. The Four Canons of Law and Economics
Economics combines mathematically precise theories and
empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects of incentives
and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to achieve
efficient results for individuals and for society.29 From this, I
derive the four canons of law and economics rhetoric:
Mathematics and Science
The primacy of mathematical and scientific methods of
analysis and demonstration
Incentives and Costs
The characterization of law and the legal system in the
language of incentives and costs
Efficiency
The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency

28

See id. at 3, 4, 5. See also JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2
(4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Kritzer, supra
note xx, at 42–43, 59.
29
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3, 4, 5. The rhetorician James Boyd
White channeled the rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the
legal system in the following way: “The overriding metaphor is that of the
machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as the
attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.” James Boyd White,
Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al. eds., 1987) (quoted in Levine &
Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note xx, at 114).
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Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice
The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by
modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science
Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as
topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in
persuasive discourse. The canons represent the fundamental
assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and
design and according to which theses concerning law and
economics
omics will be accepted as reliable and authoritative by the
members of the law and economics discipline30—in
in other words,
by the members of the law and economics discourse community.31
Therefore, these canons are described as rhetorical canons of law
and economics.

30

Efficiency

Incentives
and Costs

Math and
Science

Rational
Choice

The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and
varied, but for general reference, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 2, 3, 4, 5,
41–43; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 3–4,
4, 9, 13, 21,
24–25, 495–96;
96; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics after
Behavioral Economics
Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007).
31
“Discourse
Discourse community
community” is a term that grounds this discussion as to the
rhetoric of law and economics. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 419–38
38 (1995)
(economic representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential
Movements of the 1980s
1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 & n.53 (1989) (describing
the discourse of law and economics).
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C. The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and
Economics
Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a
manner that reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive
exercise; all of the canons work together and simul
simultaneously
taneously to
affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the discipline or
activity. Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of
the other canons, making them more or less persuasive. In
classical rhetoric, the three canons of invention (as
(aspects
pects of
persuasion that must be devised or “invented” by the author or
speaker) known as logos, ethos, and pathos,32 are often depicted as
a rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to
another and the combined impact on the recipient of the discourse:

LOGOS

PATHOS

ETHOS

With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse
presents the concept as a llinear flow-chart:33

32

Author

Message

Audience

•Ethos

•Logos

•Pathos

See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 71–84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC, supra note xx
xx, at 68, 75, 82, 89; Covino & Joliffe, supra note 15,, at
17, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage
Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Michael Frost, GrecoGreco
Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention
Invention, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 127
(1992) [hereinafter
hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis];
]; Robin Smith,
Aristotle's Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2004
ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2002/entries/aristotle
sum2002/entries/aristotle-logic/
logic/ (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011) (last substantive edit
Oct. 5, 2000).
33
WISSE, supra note xx
xx, at 8.
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James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder – Signal –
Decoder, linking the author, the language or message, and the
reader or audience to reality.34 The author projects his ethos along
with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos of the
message so as to influence the pathos of the audience.35
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.36
Aristotle sought to remind advocates that an argument is not onedimensional. The most logically constructed argument still will
not persuade an audience if the audience questions the knowledge,
skill, or credibility of the author. Similarly, the most respected
author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the
day if her argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes
apart at the seams with a single, gentle tug at one of its logical
flaws. An ironclad argument may be delivered in such a way as to
antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and
credibility of the author.37
The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact
together at the same time and toward the same audience. Proper
economic discourse incorporates each canon for the persuasion of
the audience. There is a connection and interaction in the
discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion
of the audience—one cannot alter or abandon the canons of
efficiency, mathematical and scientific certainty, response to
incentives, and even rational choice without affecting the
persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse. An
incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon
34

See JAMES L. KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE: THE AIMS OF
DISCOURSE 19 (1971) [hereinafter KINNEAVY, THEORY OF DISCOURSE]; Linda
L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader
and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000); Phelps, supra note 8, at
1091.
35
WISSE, supra note xx, at 7–8.
36
See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 614, 624, 625, 627; Eileen A.
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1728–29 (1995).
37
See generally CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72–73; Frost, Ethos,
Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note xx.
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puts the others at risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience. As
with classical rhetorical modes of invention, the interaction of the
canons of law and economics may be depicted visually, although
with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle:

Efficiency

Incentives
and Costs

Math and
Science

Rational
Choice

In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse
(Speaker)) codes the discourse ((Message)) for a particular receiver
(Audience)) according to the conditions, requirements, and
limitations of the context of the discourse ((Situation).
). In law and
economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker’s purpose is most
closely aligned with the canon of Efficiency, the Message to
achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the language of Incentives
ncentives
and Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience according to
the Rational Choice Theory
Theory, and the means used are chosen in
reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct preference for
the methods of Mathematics and Science. Therefore, I will realign
the rhetorical
orical diamond of the canons of law and economics by
depicting the flow of the discourse wherein each canon feeds into
and simultaneously dr
draws from the other canons in alignment with
the components of modern argument theory
theory:
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DISCOURSE DIAMOND of the RHETORICAL CANONS of
LAW AND ECONOMICS
INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

SPEAKER

Efficiency

SITUATION

MESSAGE
Math and
Science

Incentives
and Costs

Rational
Choice

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

AUDIENCE

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

The diagram indicates the rhetorical modes I discuss in Part III:
II:
A. Mathematics and Science Used
sed as Topics of Invention and
Arrangement and as a Trope of Style.
B. Incentives and Costs Used
sed as Topics of Invention and
Arrangement and as a Trope of Style.
C. Efficiency Used
sed as Topics of Invention and Arrangement
and as a Trope of Style.
D. Rational Choice Used
sed as Topics of Invention and
Arrangement and as a Trope of S
Style.
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III. THE CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS AS RHETORICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW

A. Rhetoric-1-2-3 Uses of Mathematics and Science as Topics of
Invention and Arrangement and a Trope of Style
Rhetoric under the modern argument theory of contemporary
rhetorical theory is crafting discourse for the audience and the
situation.38 Modern argument theory confronts the problem of the
indeterminacy of language.39
The linguistic limitations of
indeterminacy mean that arguments are not provable in the
absolute unless the language used, such as the language of
mathematics and formal logic, is determinate enough for absolute
proof, at least “proof” within the language of that discipline.40
Outside the realms of mathematics and formal logic, language is
only determinative of probabilities of meaning, so that when the
discourse extends beyond pure mathematics and formal logic,
argumentation depends on the construction of the most reasonable
and probable argument that can be made in the social situation or
institutional setting.41
The argument is not offered as
incontrovertible proof, but instead as the most reasonable and
probable outcome that can be advocated in the situation.42
38

See generally BURKE, RHETORIC OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; PERELMAN &
L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT, supra
note 18; Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92;
Greenhaw, supra note 8, at 875–80.
39
See BRUNER & AMSTERDAM, supra note 7, at chs. 2–3, 6–7; PERELMAN &
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO REASONING,
supra note 7; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 7; Smith, Rhetoric
Theory, supra note 7, at 139.
40
See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN,
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 7; Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra
note 7, at 139.
41
See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN,
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 7; Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra
note 7, at 139.
42
See generally PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7;
TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 18. In the legal arena, this theory
accepts the fact that the advocate has a client whose facts and legal situation are
not necessarily the best possible circumstances for a person legally to be
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Invention and arrangement are the canons that directly confront
the rhetorical problem of composing the language for a meaning
and persuasion by the audience in the situation:
Invention: Invention is the canon that describes the means to
create, devise, and conceive of persuasive discourse.43 The term
invention is a translation of the Latin inventio and carries the same
meaning as the Greek term for invention or discovery, heuristic
(Ευρετική).44 The canon is divided into two parts, the modes of
argument and persuasion that are invented or created by the
author—the entechnic pisteis or “artistic” or “artificial” proofs
known as logos, pathos, and ethos45—and the modes of argument
and persuasion that the author does not or cannot invent, but that
are discovered or found—the atechnic pisteis or “non-artistic” or
“non-artificial” proofs, including facts and data, statistics and
reports, documents and contracts, sworn testimony (including
expert testimony), interviews, polls, and surveys.46
The canon of invention serves as a reminder to authors of legal
discourse to consider the available means of persuasion and the
interaction of the modes chosen so as not to leave out available
means or employ self-contradictory or self-defeating means. The
classical rhetoricians did not consider this canon to be a list of
involved in; nevertheless, the advocate must offer the most reasonable, probable,
and compelling argument in support of his or her client's position that can be
raised in the situation, with the hope that the decision-maker will find the
argument more reasonable and compelling than the opponent's arguments.
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139 (citing Kurt M. Saunders, Law as
Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566, 567 (1994)).
43
Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman
Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 110.
44
See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 12, at 48; http://howtosay.org/
en_el/Heuristic (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011). “Heureka,” a/k/a “eureka,” is “I
have found (it),” the first person, singular, perfect active indicative form of
heuriskein, the Greek verb “to find.” See http://wordinfo.info/unit/781?letter=
E&spage=6 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011).
45
See, e.g., Michael R. Smith, Introduction to Logos, Pathos, and Ethos, in
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 11, at 10–25.
46
See THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990);
Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 18, at 118–21; Simpson
& Selden, supra note xx, at 1011.
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required elements of argument.47 Ideally, using the classical
rhetorical canon of invention, the discourse should be crafted to
persuade through logos,48 a logical exposition of the argument, as
well as by revealing the competence and integrity of the author to
handle the exposition itself (ethos),49 and inspire emotions that put
the audience in a frame of mind to be persuaded by the argument
(pathos),50 by using the non-artificial facts and evidence made
available by the rhetorical situation.
Classical rhetoric follows three paths simultaneously toward
the goal of persuasion: ethos (persuasion accomplished through the
perceived character or reputation of the speaker),51 pathos
(persuasion accomplished through the emotional response of the
audience to the communication),52 and logos (persuasion
accomplished through logical reasoning embodied in the content of
the communication).53 The interaction of the three means of
persuasion may be depicted as a “rhetorical triangle” similar to the
“communication triangle” discussed in contemporary rhetorical
theory54 (see diagram below):

47

See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Frost, Greco-Roman
Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 127.
48
See Smith, supra note 133.
49
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 71–77; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC, supra note 52, at 68, 75; Covino & Joliffe, supra note 15, at 52.
50
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 11, at 77–84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC, supra note xx, at 82, 89; Covino & Joliffe supra note 15, at 17.
51
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Univ. of Iowa Rhetoric Dep’t, The Rhetorical Triangle: Logos, Ethos and
Pathos, MORPHING TEXTBOOK~RHETORIC TOOLS at http://www.uiowa.edu/
~rhetoric/morphing_textbook/general/triangle.html (last accessed Dec. 27,
2010); see also KINNEAVY, THEORY OF DISCOURSE, supra note xx, at 19; Levine
& Saunders, supra note 18, at 114–15; Phelps, supra note 8, at 1091–93.
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LOGOS

PATHOS

ETHOS

In this conceptualization, the three paths of persuasion flow
into one another: the logos of the argument affects the pathos in
the audience and simultaneously affects the perception of the ethos
of the author; the pathos of the audience members affects how they
perceive the ethos of the author and how they receive the logos of
the argument.
Arrangement
Arrangement:: The classical rhetorical canon of arrangement
(Latin dispositio;; Greek taxis)) pertains to the order and design of
the discourse for persuasive effect.55 Arrangement is context and
purpose driven—
—the
the proper and persuasive arrangement of
discourse depends on the speaker, the speaker’s purpose, the
setting or situation, the characteristics of the speaker’s audience,
and the audience’s pur
purpose, desire, or motivation.56 As a starting
point, the classical rhetoricians developed a complex paradigm for
arguments that still is applied in court rules57 for trial and appellate
briefs: Exordium (introduction or statement of the issues
presented), Narratio
rratio (statement of the case), Partitio (summary of
55

See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 256–92; Berger, Law as
Rhetoric, supra note 11, at 50; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–19;
19;
Frost, Greco-Roman
Roman Legal Analysis
Analysis, supra note xx, at 182–89.
56
See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 256–92; MICHAEL H.
FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC 4, 34, 35 (2005)
[hereinafter FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC]; Berger, Law as Rhetoric,
Rhetoric
supra note 11, at 50.
57
E.g., U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules 14, 24; see FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL
RHETORIC, supra note xx
xx, at 45; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 11,, at 50.
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Confirmatio

(argument),

and

Peroratio

As with the other canons of rhetoric, arrangement was
considered to be of high importance to the persuasiveness of the
discourse. Sloppy, disorderly, or impenetrable arrangements
defeat access to the demonstration of the workings of the
argument, deny falsifiability, distract the audience’s attention from
the communication of the discourse, and deflate the audience’s
reception and reaction to the argument. All of this prevents
persuasion.
1. The Entechnic Pisteis (Artistic) Modes of Logos in
Mathematical and Scientific Methods of Invention and
Arrangement
Mathematics and science already tread the logos pathway to
persuasive discourse through the logical deductive structure of the
syllogism59 and the logical inductive structure of the induction.60
58

See FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC, supra note xx, at 45. The
dispositio of the argument also may contain refutatio, the making and meeting
of counter-arguments. In De Inventione, Cicero named six parts: exordium,
narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio (refutation, counter-argumentation),
and conclusio (conclusion). CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 17, at 1.19.
The Rhetorica ad Herennium names six parts of dispositio: exordium, narratio,
divisio (summary, breakdown of arguments), confirmatio, confutatio (counterargumentation), and conclusio. RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM § 1.3 (H. Caplan
trans., Harv. U. Press 1954). See Russ VerSteeg & Nina Barclay, Rhetoric and
Law in Ovid's Orpheus, 15 L. & LITERATURE 395, 409–10 & n.71, 413 (2003).
59
Deductive reasoning is the process of formation of a major premise or
general proposition and moving to the analysis of a minor premise or specific
proposition so as to draw a conclusion. John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach
to Mediation–Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation,
19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 88–89 (1993); Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis,
supra note xx, at 118; Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra note xx, at 492–93.
Aristotle characterized all forms of deductive reasoning as belonging to the topic
of syllogisms. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 1 at
1356. In a legal argument, a legal rule—a statement of the legal principles that
govern a general set of circumstances—is applied to a new situation—a specific
set of facts—to produce a conclusion about the outcome of this application.
MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra note xx, at 8–9.

Law and Economics’ Invention, Arrangement, and Style

25

The same forms may be used in invention and arrangement in
rhetoric to construct meaning and respond to the expectations of
the legal writing discourse community.61
The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms)62 and the
induction and example (inductive forms)63 are topoi of
60

The process of induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its
relationship to a number of other specific propositions that are known to be true.
A certain genus of situations with identifiable characteristics can be defined
from a synthesis of known situations (“species” of situations, or “precedents”)
that all share these characteristics. See Rapp, supra note xx, at §§ 5(C), 7.4.
Aristotle called a rhetorical induction an “example.” ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b; Scharffs, supra note 52, at
752 & n.58; Schmidt, supra note xx, at 372–73.
61
The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal
discourse and rhetoric derived from the classical tradition, in which there are
two permitted logical structures for an argument, the deductive and the
inductive. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a;
CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 17, at 93; QUINTILIAN, supra note 17, at
273. The forms for effective legal discourse, as opposed to mathematical,
scientific proof, were the deductive, syllogistic rhetorical form known as an
enthymeme, and the inductive rhetorical form known as an example or paradigm
argument. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.
See also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC
DISCOURSE 40 & n.49 (1991) [hereinafter KENNEDY, ON RHETORIC]. Aristotle
believed the enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms. ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a, Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.
62
In the deductive structure, both syllogisms and enthymemes begin with a
major premise and follow with a minor premise so as to produce a conclusion.
The difference between the two forms is that in a true syllogism each major
premise must be a true statement of absolute certainty, and the minor premise
also must be a true statement of absolute certainty, so that the conclusion is
absolutely, irrefutably true. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 38–48.
This is referred to by Aristotle as a “complete proof.” ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1357. In an enthymeme, the major
premise, whether it be explicitly stated or implied in the enthymeme, must be
most probably true. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 53 (quoting
ARISTOTLE, THE LOGIC: PRIOR ANALYTICS, Book II, ch. 27); Frost, Lost
Heritage, supra note 17, at 635–36; Michael Frost, Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of
Dissent: a Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY.
L.J. 167, 168 n.6 (2002) [hereinafter Frost, Scalia’s Rhetoric]; Steven D. Jamar,
Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 61, 77, 80, 81–84 (2001–2002). In other words, truth with absolute
certainty is not required, only probability of truth. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra
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arrangement in science, mathematics,
and rhetorical
64
demonstration. By borrowing the structure of mathematics and
science, legal discourse can engage in open demonstration of the
reasoning process in a form that is recognized as authoritative and
persuasive.65 The structure of the argument takes the form of
logical, scientific deduction and induction to prove the
proposition.66 Focusing on the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 uses of
note 10, at 53–54. Similarly, the minor premise must be most probably true, not
absolutely, necessarily true. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 53–54.
Corbett and Connor’s definition of enthymeme in the Aristotelian sense is more
appropriate for the evaluation of legal discourse than the more limited definition
of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism where one of the premises, usually
the major premise, is implicit and unstated. Accord EUGENE E. RYAN,
ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF RHETORICAL ARGUMENTATION 29–34, 36, 38–41
(1984); JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND
LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 4–5, 8, 37–38 (1993). As these authors
point out, the implicit major premise is one potential aspect of an enthymeme
that would differentiate it from a true syllogism, but it is not a requirement of
every enthymeme. This produces a conclusion that also is most probably true;
but this is acceptable because the enthymeme’s purpose is to persuade, not to
establish or define a proposition as a matter of scientific proof. Id. at 53. See
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 110.
63
In daily life, and particularly in the law, a rhetorician infrequently can state
an induction with as much certainty as the above example. Aristotle anticipates
this when he differentiates a rhetorical induction (an “example”) from a true
induction. See Scharffs, supra note xx, at 752 & n.58. In an example, as in an
enthymeme, the propositions induced by a representative sampling of species of
situations (cases or precedents) are asserted to be true to a high degree of
probability, not certainty. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at
Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b, Book II, ch. 19 at 1392a–1392b.
64
The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the
syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal
argument is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at
Book I, Ch. 1, at 1355a. In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of the
applicable legal principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the
specific circumstances of the case at hand, so as to describe a highly probable
conclusion or prediction about the application. Id. at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a.
65
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3, 4; Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric
and Idealogy, supra note xx, at 38–39; Kritzer, supra note xx, at 42–43, 59.
66
GEORGE PÓLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I
OF MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING v–vi (1954); McCloskey,
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 4, at 752, 760. The pros and cons
of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is growing

Law and Economics’ Invention, Arrangement, and Style

27

mathematical forms and structure, this structure of argumentation
is readily identifiable by audiences, and communicates a proper
logical structure to support the discourse (rhetoric-2) as well as
demonstrating internally consistent work of a competent author
(rhetoric-3).
Induction can inform the major premise of the deductive
structure—the process of development of the rules or standards
through the process of rule synthesis67 and explanatory synthesis.68
in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009–10. E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith
versus Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445, 451–52, 455–56 (2010).
67
Rule synthesis is a synthesis of authorities found to be on point and
controlling of a legal question in order to accurately determine and state the
prevailing law—the rules—that govern a legal issue. Authorities that control the
disposition of a legal issue must be reconciled for their explicit statements and
pronouncements of the governing legal standards as well as examined for
implicit requirements that are induced from the controlling authorities. See, e.g.,
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING chs. 10–
13 (5th ed. 2005); DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ,
SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed.
2007); HELENE S. SHAPO, ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK, WRITING AND
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 1999); Terrill Pollman,
Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal
Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909–10 (2002). Legal analysis employs
synthesis of the rules to make a single coherent statement of the applicable legal
principles that govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the “R” (Rule)
section of the discourse, or the first half of the major premise of the legal
reasoning syllogism. MURRAY & DESANCTIS, Legal Writing and Analysis,
supra note xx, chs. 2, 5, 6.
68
Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a separate
process of induction of principles of interpretation and application concerning
the prevailing rules governing a legal issue. The induction is from samples—
namely case law—representing specific situations with concrete facts and in
which the legal rules have been applied to produce a concrete outcome. While
rule synthesis is the component of legal analysis that determines what legal
standards apply to and control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to
demonstrate and communicate how these legal standards work in various
situations relevant to the legal issue at hand. See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, chs. 6,
7 (discussing explanatory synthesis); Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis and
Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 8
LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 217 (2011) [hereinafter Murray, Rule Synthesis and
Explanatory Synthesis].
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The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme provides
the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal
discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT.69 The rhetorical
logos structures of law and economics are a highly recommended
form for persuasive discourse under modern argument theory and
the contemporary rhetoric theory of discourse communities.70 This
use of mathematical structure creates meaning and communicates
persuasive discourse to each possible audience through level 1, 2,
and 3 rhetoric.
2. The Atechnic Pisteis or (Non-Artistic) Modes of Invention and
Arrangement of Mathematics and Science
Mathematics and science plays a direct role in contemporary
legal analysis of facts and data, statistics and reports, documents
and contracts, sworn testimony (including expert testimony),
interviews, polls, and surveys—in short, we have come a long way
in the proper presentation of the atechnic pisteis or (non-artistic)
modes of invention. In many areas of law (specific examples
being antitrust, taxation, and securities law, and the calculation of
damages in almost every area of contract, tort and property law),
mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive
element of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains
69

IRAC stands for Issue–Rule–Application (or Analysis)–Conclusion.
IREAC stands for Issue–Rule–Explanation–Application–Conclusion. TREAT
stands for Thesis–Rule–Explanation–Application–Conclusion.
LINDA H.
EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10,
11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and
persuasive discourse); MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra note 55, at chs. 2, 6, 7
(discussing IRAC and TREAT); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and
Professionalism: Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719–23 (2006) (discussing IRAC and IREAC); Murray,
Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra note xx; Robbins, Paradigm
Lost, supra note xx, at 484–87, 492 (discussing IRAC and IREAC).
70
The legal writing discourse community has an expectation that the
syllogistic structures of IRAC, IREAC, or TREAT will be employed, thus the
rhetorical lesson is not to disappoint this audience with a non-syllogistic
structure. See generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and
Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is
“Logic” Culturally Based? A Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S.
Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 164–77 (1997).
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or losses, or damages. In addition, at a second level of rhetoric, the
use of scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for persuasion
regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case
case—e.g.,
e.g.,
surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of empirical data,
diagrammatical demonstration, and four
four-quadrant
quadrant tabular
presentation of data
data—is a well established method of persuasion.
In both categories, the direct proof of damages or an element of the
case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of evidence, the
use is substantive, but it is employed as a language to convince the
reader of the evidence or proof of th
thee proposition, and thus is
71
rhetorical.
The use of such methods of persuasion has grown over the
years:72

This
is chart reports a single search in each decade for figures, charts,
graphics, and tabular material, and th
there
ere is no simple way to
control for
or uses that are proof of elements (such as damages) or
ordering of data and information for persuasion (e.g., evidence).
But the point of the chart is that whatever uses are made of figures,
charts, graphs,, or table
tables, the uses are going up in cases and law
aw

71

See THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990);
Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor
Rhetor, supra note 18, at 118–21;
21; Simpson
& Selden, supra note xx
xx, at 1011.
72
Westlaw search “SHOWN DEPICT! DISPLAY! PICTURED REFER! /4
FIGURE
GURE GRAPH! CHART TABULAR” with date restrictions for each decade,
e.g.,, date(>1999) & date(<2010), in ALLCASES and JLR databases.
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reviews in each decade, and markedly so in the last two decades in
law review and journal articles.
The substantive use of mathematical forms to create meaning
and communicate understanding is the topic in this section. The
more artistic and stylistic use of mathematical forms is discussed in
the next section.
3. Rhetoric-3 Uses of Mathematics and Science as a Trope of
Style
Style (Latin elocutio; Greek lexis) pertains to the composition
and wording of the discourse, including grammar, word choice,
and figures of speech.73 Figures of speech were divided into
schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary arrangements of
words), and tropes (creative variations on the meanings of
words).74 Style is dependent on the speaker, the context and
setting, and the audience, and the classical rhetoricians made
recommendations for dividing discourse into one of three levels of
style: the low or plain style (Latin infinum or humile; Greek
ischnos), the purpose of which is to teach the audience, the middle
style (Latin aequabile or mediocre; Greek mesos), the purpose of
which is to please the audience, and the grand style (Latin supra or
magniloquens; Greek adros), the purpose of which is to move the
audience.75
The audience and the situation for the discourse are, of course,
very important to the analysis of the best arguments that can be
raised,76 so modern argument theory calls for advocates to pay

73

See generally CORBETT AND CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 378; Smith,
Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 133–34 & n.2 (collecting sources on style in
classical rhetoric).
74
Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 11, at 51 & n.179.
75
See generally Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Frost, Greco
Roman Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 188–89;
76
Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92; Greenhaw,
supra note 8, at 675–80.
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particular attention to the audience and situation of their
argument.77
athematical forms (charts, diagrams, four
four-quadrant
quadrant tables,
Mathematical
algebraic formulas) can stimulate thought and imagination, leading
to rhetoric-33 appreciation of the persuasiveness of the discourse.
Example 1:78

This chart is intended to report “Ratings Of Challenges Facing
Successful Operations Of A Business In Russia (Among Selected
Major Brandholders And Trademark Owners Doing Business In
Russia),” and it is offered to demonstrate that intellectual property
protection is perceived to be a primary chall
challenge
enge confronting
international companies doing business in Russia.79 The author
describes the methodology in the following way:
In the survey, respondents were asked to rate a series of
“challenges
challenges confronting the successful operat
operations of your
business inn Russia
Russia” using a five-point scale, where one
meant “least
least important
important” and five meant “most important.”
More than one
one-half (52%) of selected major brandholders
and trademark owners doing business in Russia gave a
rating of five to intellectual property pro
protection. This ranks
intellectual property protection on virtually the same high
77

Smith, Rhetoric Theory
Theory, supra note 7, at 139.
Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights, http://www.cipr.org/activities/
surveys/top50/index.htm (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
79
Id.
78
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201
level of concern as customs (54%) and taxes (52%)
(52%)—which
have historically been perceived as presenting the greatest
challenges to business success in Russia.80

Nothing in thi
thiss chart is particularly mathematical except the
fact that the author crunched some numbers to produce the chart,
but the demonstration of the data in a bar graph with a supersuper
imposed variable line graph makes the presentation all the more
authoritative in a rhetoric-3
3 sense because it appears that a
complicated mathematical formula was applied to data to produce
this graph.
Example 2:81

I consider example 2 to be an excellent use of scientific
charting (taking the form of an informational or decisional flow
chart) to make a rhetorical
rhetorical-3 point: the procedure for acquiring a
firearm in Quebec is too complicated.

80

Id.
H. Taylor Buckner, Ph.D., Concordia's "Gun Control" Petition: Ignorance
of the Law is the Only Excuse
Excuse, http://www.tbuckner.com/IGNOLAW.HTM (last
accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
81
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Example 3:82

This chart discusses the rise and fall of city names in English
language literature, and claims that this Googl
Googlee Lab chart reports
the results of a search of city names in the vast amount of literature
that Google has scanned and compiled for searching.83 The chart
purports to tell us something about “the relative importance of
different power centers in the public imagination.”84 The author
could have stated (in plain English): when searching for “Paris,
London, New York, Boston and Rome,” in the scanned English
literature from 1750 to 2008, interest in London remained steady
and at a higher level than Paris, Bosto
Boston,
n, and Rome, while interest
in New York started at very low point but grew steadily,
surpassing London in approximately 1910, and continued to rise in
popularity until 1980, when it began a steady decline. This would
have accurately stated the purported ffindings,
indings, but the graphing of
the information sends a very different rhetoric
rhetoric-3 message—that
that
82

Android6 blog, The Fall and Rise of Twitter in English Literature,
http://android6.net/the
http://android6.net/the-fall-and-rise-of-twitter-in-english-literature/
(last
accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
83
Id.
84
Id.
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something scientific was done, and produced the results the readers
see before them.
Mathematical forms are a persuasive tool, but the tool is only
as good as the user, and the user must be careful about proper uses
in proper situations. In general legal discourse, the use of law and
economics mathematical and scientific forms and schemes as an
artistic or stylistic mode comes with a word of caution that is
grounded in the very discipline from which the rhetorical use of
such forms is drawn: Contemporary law and economics assumes
and advocates the rhetorical primacy of scientific and
mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses,
designing the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing
the data, statistics, and information collected to test the
hypotheses.85 Law and economics also assumes the rhetorical
primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to
openly demonstrate the analyses and reveal its theses about human
behavior for examination and critique.86 The rhetorical power of a
mathematical proof or a demonstration of a scientific deduction or
induction lies is the openness and transparency of the
demonstration. The premises (major and minor) and the nature of
the hypothesis induced from the comparison of genus and species
of data must be fully disclosed and described so as to allow the
presentation to be analyzed and rebutted. The assertions made in
reference to the information displayed must be falsifiable;
tautological explication (the information is what it is) adds nothing
to meaning or understanding, and does not contribute to the mode
of persuasion that points to truth. At worst, using mathematical
forms simply to dazzle or confuse the audience or obfuscate the
relevant information pertinent to the issue is the worst form of
85

See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 15–16; Posner,
Foreword, supra note xx, at 5; Richard A. Posner, Afterword, supra note xx, at
437. See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web
of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66
TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 (1998); Gary Minda, supra note xx, at 611–12.
86
See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 57, 59 (1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980).
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trickery (mere rhetoric, not actual rhetoric). Consider the following
chart of the Obama Health Care Reform initiative:87

I may be wrong, but I don’t think the intention of the author of this
chart was to make clear the available options offered under the
health care reform initiative.
B. Rhetorical Lessons in Defining Legal Phenomena as Incentives
and Costs
This section discusses: (1) rhetoric-3 uses of incentives and
costs as a trope of style (i.e., a figure of speech using incentives
and costs as a metaphor in discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and
rhetoric-3 concept of incentives and costs in the organization and
presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention and
87

Paul
Ibrahim,
Politics,
Economics,
and
More
http://www.paulibrahim.com/blog/2009/7/16/get-well-soon-health-carebureaucracy-chart.html (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011).

blog,

36

[FEBRUARY 2012]

arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).
1. Incentives and Costs as a Rhetoric-3 Trope of Style
Economics and behavioral science informs legal discourse and
communication by pointing out that people respond to incentives.
Contemporary law and economics, informed by the lessons of
behavioral science, offers a rhetorical perspective on legal
discourse and communication because the study of persuasion in
legal communication involves an analysis of what an author
(speaker, writer, communicator) can do to create incentives to
attract or motivate the reader (listener, etc.) while avoiding
imposing costs on the reader.
A trope is “a deviation from the ordinary and principal
signification of a word.”88 Metaphor is a trope of style in rhetoric,
one of the figures of speech described and applied within the canon
of style.89 Metaphor is one of the “master tropes,” the others being
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.90 Numerous disciplines have
88

EDWARD P.J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT
461 (1971).
89
Professor Stephanie A. Gore defines a metaphor as follows:
A “metaphor” is defined as a “figure of speech in which a word or
phrase that ordinarily designates one thing is used to designate another,
thus making an implicit comparison.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). A metaphor
may also be defined as “an implied analogy imaginatively identifying
one object with another and ascribing to the first object one or more of
the qualities of the second.” C. HUGH HOLMAN & WILLIAM HARMON,
A HANDBOOK TO LITERATURE 298 (5th ed. 1986). The Princeton
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics elegantly defines metaphor as “[a]
condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by
the presence of one or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be
enhanced in vividness, complexity, or breadth of implication.”
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 490 (Ales
Preminger ed., enlarged ed., 1974).”
Stephanie A. Gore,“A Rose By Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors
For New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 404–05 (2003),
90
BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 18, at Appx. D. Burke
described the master tropes as follows: For metaphor we could substitute
perspective; For metonymy we could substitute reduction; for synecdoche we
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studied the power of metaphor in discourse, including linguistics,
philosophy, rhetoric, cognitive psychology, and literary theory.91
Recent literary and cognitive studies of metaphor92 have shown
that:
could substitute representation; for irony we could substitute dialectic. Id.
(emphasis omitted).
91
Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58
MERCER L. REV. 919, 919–20 (2007) (citing Linguistics sources: GEORGE
LAKOFF, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with Mark Johnson); GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A
FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR (1989) (with Mark Turner); GEORGE
LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (1996);
GEORGE LAKOFF, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with Mark Johnson); GEORGE
LAKOFF, "DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME
THE DEBATE” THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); GEORGE
LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND
VISION (2006); Philosophy sources: MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY
(1980) (with George Lakoff); MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON METAPHOR (Mark Johnson ed., 1981); MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE
MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987);
MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
FOR ETHICS (1993); MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with
George Lakoff); Rhetoric sources: Michael H. Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of
Metaphoric Reasoning, in INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A
LOST HERITAGE 85 (2005); Michael R. Smith, The Power of Metaphor and
Simile in Persuasive Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 179, 179 (1st ed. 2002); Cognitive
psychology sources: STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW,
LIFE, AND MIND (2001); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Steven L. Winter,
The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1105 (1989); and Literary Theory sources: Michael R. Smith, The
Functions of Literary References in Persuasive Writing: A Multidisciplinary
Analysis, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 11, at 9, 15–30 (discussing
“Literary References for Nonthematic Metaphoric Comparison”).
92
E.g., Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2
LEGAL WRITING 113, 135–38 (1996) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman
Metaphor].
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Literary analysis and cognitive psychology theory analyze
the use and effect of metaphors in ways that resemble the
techniques of their Greco-Roman counterparts. In some
recent discussions of metaphors' place in legal discourse,
analysts reject the view that metaphors are merely
superficial stylistic devices. They assert, with Haig
Bosmajian, that “it is now well established that the tropes,
especially the metaphor, are not simply rhetorical flourishes
used to embellish discourse.”93 Instead, these analysts
maintain that metaphors are essential devices for achieving
certain sorts of intellectual insights. Classical rhetoricians'
recognized that metaphors provide insights or “fresh
knowledge”94 that can “scarcely be conveyed”95 by other
means. Under this view, metaphors become important
intellectual components of legal analysis rather than mere
mnemonic or focusing devices.96

Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo warned that "[m]etaphors in law are
to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it.”97
The rhetorical path that uses incentives and costs as a metaphor
for conditions and effects in the law is a well-traveled path in legal
discourse.98 Every time an author writes about a cost-benefit
analysis, the use of the term “cost” stands in as a metaphor, a
rhetorical trope that attempts to transfer the concept of a cost onto
to the understanding of the actual action or condition described.
The word “benefit” similarly stands in to communicate a beneficial
93

Id. (citing HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 441 (1992). See also Haig Bosmajian, “The Judiciary's Use of
Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection
to Students and Teachers,” 444 J.L. & EDUC. 443 (1986)).
94
Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at 206).
95
Id. (citing CICERO, DE ORATORE, supra note 17, at 123).
96
Id. at 135–37.
97
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926)
(Cardozo, J.). Thus, Judge Cardozo used a metaphor (liberation or enslavement
of thought) to criticize the use of metaphors in law.
98
Note the metaphor I am using here. Metaphors are unavoidable in legal
discourse.
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meaning to the reader concerning the actual effect or change in
condition discussed in the discourse. Every time a change in the
law is said to “incentivize” certain conduct, the concept of
“incentive” is a metaphor for the intention of the actor to motivate
a certain reaction by offering something desired by the recipient.
Every time a license or permit application process is said to
provide a “disincentive” to an activity, the term “disincentive” is
used to convey the negative effects of the condition described in
the discourse. Every time a change in procedural rules is said to
impose an “externality” on the cost of litigation, the author uses
“externality” as a figure of speech to suggest that the law imposes
a “cost” that is not internalized by one or more of the parties in the
discussion. This is in fact a metaphor within a metaphor—both
“cost” and “internalize” are used metaphorically in this example.
By using the terms “incentives” and “costs” metaphorically,
legal authors can discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or
costs in contexts that are not necessarily business or contract
settings or do not involve the calculation of pecuniary sums or
damages.99 This expansion in language may improve
communication—the enlightening aspect of metaphor in discourse.
Of course, with regard to proper ethos, the recommendation to use
metaphor in rhetoric-3 applications comes with Judge Cardozo’s
highly metaphorical warning not to let the metaphor enslave the
reader’s thinking on the topic.
99

In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and
securities law, and the calculation of damages in almost every area of law),
mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive element of the
action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages. In
addition, at the level rhetoric-2, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as
topoi for persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the
case—e.g., surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of empirical data,
diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant tabular presentation of data—
is a well established method of persuasion. In both categories, the direct proof
of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive ordering and
presentation of evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed in a language
to convince the reader of the evidence or proof of the proposition, and thus is
rhetorical. See, e.g., THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION
15 (1990); Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 18, at 118–
21; Simpson & Selden, supra note xx, at 1011.
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2. Rhetoric-2 and Rhetoric-3 Incentives and Costs of
Organization and Presentation of the Discourse as Topics of
Invention and Arrangement
The economic rhetorical use of incentives and costs also has
rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 application in the organization and
presentation of the discourse as topics of invention and
arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).
Contemporary law and economics informs contemporary rhetorical
studies of invention, arrangement, and style adding to the
knowledge-base of studies of writing as a process and discourse
community theory. The rhetorical perspective of economics and
behavioral science informs the study and understanding of
effective legal communication by demonstrating the means by
which an author can create incentives to attract or motivate the
reader while avoiding imposing costs on the reader. As one
example, incentives can be created in legal communication and
transaction costs can be avoided in legal communication by
compositional choices made by the author through the use of a
helpful, reader-oriented organizational paradigm such as the
TREAT paradigm.100 Incentives can be created and costs can be
avoided in legal communication by organization of the contents of
communications into rule formation (rule section) and separate
explanation of how the rule works (explanation section).101
Incentives can be created and costs can be imposed in legal
communication by the method of syntheses of authorities used to
demonstrate both the legal rules that govern the issue and how
those legal rules work in actual, concrete situations by the use of
explanatory synthesis.102
C. Rhetorical Use of Efficiency in Legal Discourse
As specifically applied to the rhetorical canons of invention,
arrangement, and style, the rhetorical perspective of economics and
100
101
102

MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra note xx, at ch. 6.
Id.
See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra note xx_.
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behavioral science can inform the discussion by demonstrating that
efficiency supports the persuasiveness of legal discourse.
1. Rhetoric-3 Use of Efficiency in Invention and Creation of
Meaning
Economic or productive efficiency is the application of the
term “efficiency” that is best known to non-economists. The
advice for legal authors seeking rhetoric-3 recognition of the
meaning of the term when used outside of strict economic analysis
is to use the term “efficiency” or “efficient” to refer to an
avoidance of waste, a reduction in costs (transaction costs,
collateral costs, or externalities), or other savings in time or money
that have been or would be brought about by a change in the law.
Saving money or time is nearly universally valued as a goal in life
and in the law. Emphasis of efficiency—the phrasing and defining
of elements of the circumstance in terms of efficiency in the time
or cost saving sense—is rhetorically valuable.
2. Rhetoric-2 and Rhetoric-3 Efficiency in Arrangement and Style
Law and economics advocates elegance and efficiency in the
form, structure, and composition of economic discourse. This
lesson from the canons of law and economics teaches legal authors
to follow a prescription to make their discourse clear, concise,
succinct, and elegant in form. The formal use of the term
efficiency benefits clarity and promotes comprehension of
meaning over confusion and frustration. It opens doors to
falsifiability because the material is more accessible for analysis
and criticism if it is clear and succinct. The door to falsifiability is
closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation in legal
discourse. Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted are highly
persuasive.
D. Rhetorical Lessons from Contemporary Rational Choice
Theory
The lessons for rhetorical discourse using the definition of
rational choice in contemporary law and economics have become
more complicated as our understanding of human behavior grows,
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but the consequences of the contemporary theories of rational
choice ultimately coincide with lessons learned from classical
rhetoric and modern studies of cognition and brain science. I will
discuss the rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational choice
theory in three areas: (1) rhetoric-1 framing of legal issues to
respond to biases and heuristics and to situational conditions on
rational choice as a mode of invention and arrangement;
(2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and invention (synthesis and
syllogistic structure) to appeal to the rational audience; and (3)
rhetoric-3 uses of pathos-centric modes of argument—metaphor,
parable/mythical/fable forms, character archetypes, and other
forms of narrative reasoning—as topics of invention and tropes of
style to address anchoring, endowment effects, and other heuristics
and biases of legal audiences based on the lessons of pathos from
modern cognitive studies and brain science.
1. The Rhetoric-1 Importance of Framing in Invention and
Arrangement
It is challenging to manage the modeling and framing of broad
concepts such as fairness and justice in economic theory, but the
rhetorical implications of the empirical observations in law and
economics, cognitive studies, and brain science reveal that people
respond to justice and fairness in legal discourse. These studies
confirm what has been predicted by the advocates of the modes of
persuasion of logos, ethos, and pathos. Arguments framed from a
more general perspective of how the law and the public policy
behind the law supports the argument are, of course, a necessary
part of legal discourse, and a legal author does not need law and
economics to tell her that.
Other theories developed through empirical testing of rational
choice biases and heuristics with a predictable effect on decisionmaking, such as the endowment effect, the status quo bias, and
risk/loss aversion, can be used to frame arguments. For example,
if an author combines two lessons from the experiments of
behavioral science—the experiments indicating that framing of
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choice matters because decision-making is context-based,103 and
the experiments indicating that the endowment effect or status quo
bias plays a strong role in contract negotiation104—creates a
rhetorical prescription for advocates: advocates should work to
carefully and advantageously define the starting point terms of a
negotiation (which will, as indicated by the experiments, be
perceived and responded to as the status quo)105 or the status of the
current law from which the tribunal must move forward to
adjudicate the client’s matter (which, again, will be perceived as
the status quo),106 and simultaneously work to frame the choices of
departure in such a way that the preferred outcome for a client is
framed as an appropriate compromise choice—not the most
extreme or most expensive departure from the status quo starting
positions (as defined by the advocate), but not the smallest
departure either.107
2. Rhetoric-1 and Rhetoric-2 Logos Topics of Arrangement and
Invention (Inductive Synthesis and Syllogistic Structures) for
the Rational Audience (the Legal Writing Discourse
Community)
The overall structure of legal discourse, both in terms of
invention and arrangement, should be drafted with regard to the
logos topics of syllogistic structure and inductive synthesis. The
rhetoric-1 audience of legal discourse is law-trained readers—the
legal writing discourse community. The expectations of this group
manifestly support using a logical syllogistic structure for the
overall architecture of the discourse, and the Anglo-American
theory of precedent and stare decisis support the inductive
103

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 4, 5 (2000)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS]; Mark Kelman, Yuval
Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision
Making, in SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra at 61–62, 73–
74, 76.
104
Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics and Contract Law, in SUNSTEIN,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note xx, at 116–119, 120–121, 136–
138.
105
Id. at 136.
106
Id. at 137.
107
Kelman, Rottenstreich, & Tversky, supra note xx, at 74–76.
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structure of a synthesis of authorities to determine the legal
standards governing an issue. The lessons of modern cognitive
studies and brain science that challenge many of the assumptions,
premises, and paradigms of traditional rational choice theory in
law and economics do not wipe the slate clean from the
expectations of the legal writing discourse community and its basic
conventions for organization and demonstration. Even if indirect
audiences are contemplated, in rhetoric-2 persuasion, the logical
syllogistic structure is a widely accepted method of demonstration.
If used properly with appropriate attention to the ethos of the
discussion, the structure opens up the premises and evidence of the
discussion to examination and potential criticism or rebuttal. A
proper synthesis identifies the species that are examined as well as
the newly identified genus principles that are induced from the
species, or it identifies the existing genus principles that are
applied to the newly identified species of the genus depending on
which side of the induction the discussion falls. In short, in
invention and arrangement, there is no ready substitute for the
logical syllogistic structure of legal discourse and the inductive
structure of synthesis.
3. Rhetoric-3 Rational Choice Lessons Concerning Pathos-Based
Modes of Persuasion to Address Cognitive and Situational
Effects on Decision-making
A significant part of contemporary law and economics’ rational
choice theory is under examination to challenge the assertion that
legal decision-makers are autonomous individuals weighing costs
and benefits in individualistic terms, unaffected by context and
situation. Under the traditional and still prevailing doctrine of
rational choice, rational decision-making should not be affected by
situation, meaning that choices that maximize the decision-makers’
ends should not be affected by situation. The values and interests
implicated by a choice may be different from individual to
individual, but once identified, the choices made in recognition of
the same values and interests should not change from situation to
situation. Cognitive studies and brain science on situational
decision-making take the opposite tack based on empirical
evidence and argue that decisions are affected by biases and
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heuristics that are connected to the context and situation of the
decision-making.108
Cognitive studies and brain science have worked a similar
correction in contemporary rhetoric’s modern argument theory: the
assumptions and premises of classical and traditional theories of
rhetoric regarding audience have been refined by modern social
science and cognitive studies that redefine the concept of the
rhetorical situation in a way that affects every part of persuasive
discourse, the audience, the message, and the speaker.109 The
lessons learned in both contemporary law and economics and
contemporary rhetoric can inform both disciplines to improve
theories, predictions, and prescriptions about changes in economic
analysis of law and legal discourse.
Situational decision-making often implicates the different
values that people assign to different choices depending on the
context and situation in which the decision is to be made,110 and a
rhetorical examination of values leads to the analysis of
pathos111—the emotional response to persuasive discourse112—
108

See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5; Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situational Character, supra note 1; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and
Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 105–09 (2002).
109
See, e.g., MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE, supra note 16, at 9;
ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, supra note 16, at 9; Bitzer,
The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92; White, Law as
Rhetoric, supra note 13, at 695; Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial, supra note
16, at 1546.
110
Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in
Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 & n.24, 614–15, 625–26, 644–45
(2003); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible
Indifference Curves, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 171 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 2000); Mitchell, supra note 106, at 101–10, 160–64. See
also Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast
and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992); Amos
Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI.
1179, 1179 (1993).
111
Pathos is one of the three artistic topoi of invention, an essential mode of
persuasion in classical rhetoric. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 99 (Thomas
O. Sloan ed., 2001); Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent Posner-Style: Judge Richard
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because values in contemporary brain science appear to be the
most important trigger of emotional conviction.113 Contemporary
A. Posner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 69 MO. L. REV. 73, 158
(2004). Quintilian put great stock in emotional appeals, Frost, Ethos, Pathos &
Legal Audience, supra note xx, at 91, claiming that, “this emotional power . . .
dominates the court [;] it is this form of eloquence that is queen of all.” 2
QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, supra note 17, at 419. Quintilian, like
Aristotle, thought that “the duty of the [advocate] is not merely to instruct: the
power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals.” Id. at 139; see Frost,
Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note xx, at 91. Over-reliance on the
logos, the logical presentation, of an argument may be a myopic tendency of
lawyers, but it is likewise clear that pathos cannot be controlled directly by legal
argument. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 78. See also Kenneth D.
Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7
J. ALWD 1, 3, 5, 29–30 (2010) (an empirical study of the persuasiveness of
logos-centric vs. pathos-centric briefs). The classical rhetoricians recognized
that our emotions are not entirely under the control of our will and our intellect.
CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 78. We cannot use logic to argue an
audience into an emotional state any more than we can will ourselves into an
emotional reaction based on an intellectual conviction that we should have a
certain emotional reaction to a certain set of facts or a particular logical appeal.
See id. An advocate that explicitly announces that he or she will play on the
audience’s emotions in the presentation of the discourse will inevitably achieve
the opposite result; the audience, made wary of emotional manipulation, will at
best steel themselves not to be manipulated and at worst will discount the
advocate’s presentation on the grounds that the advocate has engaged in trickery
and subterfuge. See id. at 78–79. Thus, the advocate must not openly play upon
the audience’s heart strings, but instead must carefully and subtly arrange the
facts and narrative reasoning of the case in conjunction with the logic and legal
reasoning of the argument. See id.; Chestek, supra, at 2, 3, 5, 29–32; Frost,
Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note xx, at 94.
112
See, e.g., John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation—Part I:
Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 83, 92 (1993); D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based
Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 57, 59 (1997). See also EMOTIONS,
COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR 112 (Carroll E. Izard et al. eds., 1984); Arlie Russell
Hochschied, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING
(1983); Carroll E. Izard, HUMAN EMOTIONS (1977).
113
See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE
FEELING BRAIN 54 (2003); ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR:
EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 96–97, 170–75, 250 (1994)
[hereinafter DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR]. See also RAYMOND ROSS,
UNDERSTANDING PERSUASION 7 (3rd ed. 1990); Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra
note 11, at 28; Robert F. Blomquist, The Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer?, 15
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rhetoric encompasses examination and consideration of the values
of the audience, as well as their passions and biases, in its study of
the use of practical reasoning and informal logic, narrative
reasoning (and its many sub-categories—storytelling, mythical
forms, parable forms, hero-antihero archetypes), and the schemes
and tropes of composition in analogical and literary forms (e.g.,
schemes and figures of speech, metaphor theory, and literary
allusion).114 Contemporary law and economics describes the same

WIDENER L. REV. 93, 114, 133 (2009); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire:
The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS
L. REV. 381 (2008); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial
Exploration, 2006 MICH. L. REV. 411, 412–19 (2006).
Damasio describes the brain process of somatic marking which is used to
evaluate experience of the world, tagging certain facts as useful and valuable
toward an objective, and rejecting many others. In decision-making, such as the
task of jurors, the process involves the somatic marking of evidence for its
salience toward the decision, winnowing down the possible choices and their
consequences based on the somatic marker (loosely characterized as a "gut
feeling") assigned to the evidence. (Contemporary legal economists and
behavioral scientists would characterize this as the application of affect
heuristics.) E.g., Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments
of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 2 (2000)). Jurors then
seek a narrative that makes sense fitting the marked evidence into a coherent,
lifelike, believable story. Jurors can supply their own narrative, or the advocate
can supply a lifelike, believable storyline that fits the facts (and assists the
client), which emphasizes the need for storytelling as a tool of narrative
reasoning in legal discourse. See generally DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR,
supra, at 170–75; Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1609, 1628, 1631–33 (2007).
114
See, e.g., SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 11, at ch. 3;
Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEG.
WRITING 127 (2008); Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A
Rhetorician's Invitation to the Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457 (2001);
Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in the Law: Myth, Metaphor and
Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 883 (2010); Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of
Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD.
FORUM 7 (1996); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer
for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive
Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001); Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a
Narrative Primer, 12 LEGAL WRITING 229 (2006); J. Christopher Rideout,
Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING
53 (2008); Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin:
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type of phenomena as biases and heuristics—anchoring, status quo
bias, endowment effect bias, risk/loss aversion, representativeness
heuristic, availability heuristic, and probability assessment
dysfunctionality.115 Contemporary rhetoric applies cognitive
studies and brain science to inform the predictions of audience
reaction and motivation produced by the use of certain topics of
invention or tropes of style,116 much in the same way that
contemporary law and economics looks to cognitive studies and
brain science for the same lessons in audience reaction and
motivation.117
Telling the Client's Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal
Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006).
115
Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 1471–550; Russell Korobkin,
Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in SUNSTEIN,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note xx, at 116–43; Korobkin &
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1076–78; Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories, supra note xx, at 1499–540; Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1128–1130 (1974).
116
For example, the evaluation of the use of metaphor as a method of pathosbased persuasion and transmission of meaning has caused rhetoricians to look to
social science and cognitive studies to study the effects of metaphor in
communication. E.g., OWEN BARFIELD, POETIC DICTION: A STUDY IN MEANING
63–64 (1964); HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 152, 441 (1992); JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION:
STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 695, 707 (1973);
Haig Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use of Metaphors, Metonymies and Other
Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers, 444 J. L.
& EDUC. 443 (1986); Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor, supra note xx, at 135–38;
Burr Henly, “Penumbra”: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 82 (1987); Edward L. Murray, The Phenomenon of the Metaphor:
Some
Theoretical
Considerations,
2
DUQUESNE
STUDIES
IN
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 288 (A. Giorgi, C. Fischer & E. Murray,
eds., 1975); Steven L. Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 745, 759 (1992) (reviewing THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS
CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991)).
117
Most if not all of the sources on behavioral law and economics indicate a
trend toward incorporating cognitive studies, and the most cutting edge of these
sources point toward new ways of understanding incentives and motivation
through brain science. See, e.g., John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North,
Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance of Constraints on
Non-Rational Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 131 (2008); Terrence
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There are two rhetorical lessons to be drawn from this
observation: first, that a single rhetorical approach to discourse
may miss the audience and fall short of the rhetorical situation.
Discourse should be crafted in layers, and by this I do not simply
mean the rhetoric-1, -2, or -3 levels pertaining to different
audiences, but rather the use of multiple layers using different
modes of persuasion directed toward the same audience for the
same level of rhetorical communication; second, that a writer
should consider pathos-based modes of persuasion, such as
narrative theory and storytelling modes to target the values of the
audience in the situation and present discourse that the audience
will identify and accept, perhaps not as the sole mode of
persuasion, but as one layer in the communication.
CONCLUSION
The rhetorical canons of law and economics are tools for legal
discourse, not universal goals and not perfect solutions. Law and
economics provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author
might examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse.
But a lens, like any other tool, is only as good as its user. The
critics of the role of neoclassical law and economics in removing
or blocking restraints on and limiting measures to oversee the
American financial markets and banking system118 give us a
sobering reminder that law and economics rhetoric can be used to
persuade highly intelligent, lawyers, judges, academics, legislators,
and government officials to allow and even to put into place
conditions that precipitated the most severe economic crisis since
the Great Depression.
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and improved
upon the basic perceptions of human behavior and knowledge of
human nature of the ancient rhetoricians, but the more complex
models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric have not replaced
Chorvat, Kevin McCabe, & Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 35 (2005); Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the
Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1599 (2000).
118
See sources cited in notes 1-2 supra.
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the classical rhetorical concept of ethos. Contemporary rhetoric
has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain science that
confirm the importance of the classical rhetorical concept of pathos
and the necessity that rhetoric examine the values of the audience
in the rhetorical situation so as to anticipate the emotional reaction
of the audience to the discourse. Similar lessons are being learned
in contemporary law and economics as brain science and cognitive
studies add to our “understanding of understanding” and motivate
our study of motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks
to improve the designing of incentives in the face of new
conceptions of rational choice. Each discipline can learn lessons
from the other about the motivation and persuasion of different
audiences in different situations.
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from the new school of
contemporary rhetoric, law and economics. Efficiency, when used
in appropriate ways in appropriate rhetorical situations, can
improve discourse in style, arrangement, and invention. The
expression of legal conditions and legal effects in the language of
incentives and costs inspires imagination that allows better
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of laws and
legal policy; its widespread acceptance in the law is only further
evidence of the rhetorical power of the language across many areas
of the law and many legal situations. The persuasiveness of
mathematics and science extends to their forms and the substance
of their proofs, and the use of the methods and forms may create
meaning and inspire imagination that improves comprehension and
understanding. The forms of mathematics and science can
promote clarity and open demonstration, permitting examination of
the workings of the discourse and promoting the opportunity for
falsification and rebuttal.
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but not
universally persuasive. A topic of invention is a single place to
find a method of argumentation, not the only place. Many
audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific forms,
especially if they are used to attempt to avoid a primary question of
fairness or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form
(elegance, openness, and clarity) and in the elimination of costs
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and waste may be widely persuasive, but other economic rhetorical
turns on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) are best
left to rhetoric-1 discourse of economists. Incentives and costs is a
language, and many rhetorical situations accept this language, but
the general application must fit the topic and the situation; simply
identifying something as an incentive or a cost will not be
persuasive if the audience or the situation demands a different
topos for argument or a more apt trope of style.
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of law
and economics. Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms of
contemporary economics, many of which were stated well before
the Great Recession, have asserted that mathematical and scientific
methods of daunting complexity are used in law and economics to
hide the workings of the reasoning, not to promote understanding
or persuasion. The method is not rhetoric but a resort to the
cudgel, used to overpower the audience with coercion not
persuasion. The formula might hide the workings of the reasoning
rather than openly demonstrate the reasoning for falsification or
rebuttal, all under an implied challenge and a dare to rebut the
force of such a powerful device. Charts and diagrammatics may be
used to distract the audience or trick them into believing a
mathematical or scientific analysis was performed to produce the
assertions made in the rhetoric, when little or no math or science
was involved. Quantitative analysis may crunch data the true
meaning of which is buried in the assumptions made that chose
what data to collect and what to exclude, and in the premises
drawn from the assumptions that determined the possible
conclusions that could be drawn from the experiment or analysis.
Law and economics relies on mathematics and science,
efficiency, incentives and costs, and rational choice theory for
rhetoric-1 communication with legal economists, but often uses the
same topics and tropes as powerful props in rhetoric-2 and
rhetoric-3 communication with lawmakers and policy-makers—
again, rightly or wrongly according to the ethos of the speaker and
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the communication.119 The canons of law and economics rhetoric,
like the canons of the other schools of contemporary rhetoric, may
be employed to promote effective communication for the purpose
of persuasion, or be used as mere rhetoric, to distract, confuse,
obfuscate, or coerce the audience. This is a lesson for all
rhetoricians, those of law and economics and of general legal
discourse, made all the more clear by the example of the use of the
rhetoric of law and economics in ways that helped to bring about
the Great Recession.

119

My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt
comment, “Statistics never lie—but liars use statistics.”

